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Abstract
To study the effect of political and institutional changes on the economy, we
look at share prices in the Santiago exchange during the tumultuous political events
that characterized Chile in the early 1970s. We use a transparent empirical strat-
egy, deploying previously unused daily data and exploiting two largely unexpected
shocks which involved substantial variation in policies and institutions, providing
a rare natural experiment. Allende’s election and subsequent socialist experiment
decreased share values, while the military coup and dictatorship that replaced him
boosted them, in both cases by magnitudes unprecedented in the literature.
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12 September, 1970:
Kissinger: “The big problem today is Chile”
Nixon: “Their stock market went to hell”
1 Introduction
The election of Salvador Allende’s socialist government in Chile in 1970 and its subse-
quent reversal by a military coup in 1973 provide a curiously unexploited opportunity to
study the effect of institutional shocks on economic outcomes.1 Unidad Popular (UP),
the left-wing political coalition that supported Allende, promised, and after elected took
steps to implement profound changes to economic institutions and the structure of prop-
erty rights, towards the final goal of replacing capitalism with some form of socialism.
The military coup ended Allende’s socialist experiment and promised a return to pro-
business policies, but now under authoritarian rule.2
From a research standpoint, the importance of these events lies not only in the large
institutional and policy variation involved, but also in the fact that the outcome of the
1970 election was a surprise. Prior to the election, for example, the leading daily El
Mercurio had published a number of polls showing Jorge Alessandri (a rightwing inde-
pendent who had been president from 1958 to 1964) leading Allende by a considerable
margin (Table 1). We will use data from vote expectation surveys to show that the
perceived probability of a socialist victory was indeed rather low, particularly among
potential shareholders (Tables 4 and 5).3 Moreover, while an attempt to remove Allende
from power was expected by many, an attempted military coup had already failed earlier
in the year, so the success of the coup in September 1973 could not have been entirely
anticipated.
Natural experiments allowing convincing identification of the effect of sharp changes
in economic institutions on the valuation of assets seldom arise. As a result of Hotelling-
1The epigraph is from a 12:32pm telephone conversation in Washington. Source: Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 364
2Major sources on the history of the Allende government and of the military coup are Stallings (1978);
Sigmund (1977); Nef (1983); Larrain and Meller (1991)
3Besides the quantitative evidence that we will provide here, the fact that the Allende victory was
largely unexpected is reported also in Sigmund (1977, pp. 106-110); Marash (1988); Navia (2004); Hersh
(1983, p. 273); NSC (1970).
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Downs pressures for platform convergence (Downs, 1957), in closely contested elections
with uncertain outcomes party programs are rarely radically different when it comes
to fundamental economic institutions. Non-electoral institutional shocks, such as those
arising from a revolutionary transfer of power, are rarely unanticipated and are typically
associated with other relevant changes that confound the pure ’institution shock effect’,
making identification virtually impossible.
To assess the stock-market reaction to these two shocks we employ daily data on
the General Index of Stock Prices (IGPA) calculated by the Santiago exchange, a
capitalization-weighted index that includes most listed companies. Historical daily data
on the IGPA index is proprietary, and we purchased it from the Santiago exchange. We
complement this information with newly digitized data on individual stocks.4
Figure 1 displays the IGPA in a long window around our period of interest. Hav-
ing risen under Alessandri, stock market valuations had declined during the presidency
of Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964-1970), a Christian Democratic leader who enacted re-
distributive policies, most notably in the areas of education, land reform and taxation
(Ffrench-Davis, 1973; Kirkendall, 2004; Thome, 1971). They decreased further during
Allende’s socialist presidency, before experiencing a strong revival after the military
coup.
2 The Unidad Popular electoral victory
Allende’s margin of victory over the runner-up Alessandri in the 1970 election was just
1.34%.5 Respecting a longstanding political tradition, Allende would later be confirmed
as president.
In the first trading day after the election,6 the IGPA fell by 22%. This constitutes
4We hand-collected data on the daily prices of individual stocks listed in the Santiago exchange from
copies of the Chilean newspaper El Mercurio, which we accessed in microfilm format at Yale University
library.
5Allende 36.61%; Alessandri 35.27%; Tomic (Christian Democratic) 28.11%.
6This was Tuesday September 8: the market was closed the Monday after the election. Although the
management of the stock exchange declared that activity had been interrupted because of “technical
reasons” (El Mercurio, 1970b), contemporary observers countered that the stock market had actually
been closed in an attempt to mitigate financial panic due to the election outcome. For example, the US
magazine TIME wrote that “fearful of a stampede of scared investors, the Santiago stock market closed
for a day for the first time since 1938.”. (TIME, 1970)
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the largest daily decrease in share prices ever recorded in Santiago in the period for
which we have data (1961-2016). Compared with the empirical distribution of daily
fluctuations in the IGPA until that day, this daily change is 25.8 standard deviations
below the sample mean (16.1 standard deviations if considering the whole 1961-2016
period), and in absolute value is 2.5 times larger than the previous maximum deviation.
Figure 2 displays trading days before and after the election on the horizontal axis (with
the first trading day after the event equal to zero) and the IGPA index on the vertical
axis. For ease of interpretation, a vertical red dashed line corresponds to the last trading
day before the election.
Stock prices kept falling for around 15 trading days after the event, and stabilized
at a much lower level around the end of the month. Between September 3 1970 (the last
trading day before the election) and September 30, the IGPA fell by 48.6 percentage
points.
The behavior of individual stocks suggests that the continuing substantial decline
in share values in the days immediately after the ‘Allende shock’ was partly due to the
fact that many stocks were not traded at all in the immediate aftermath of the election.
According to the daily commentary of stock-market activity published on El Mercurio,
the market was partly frozen in the first trading day after the election, with would-be
sellers struggling to find buyers (El Mercurio, 1970a).
Indeed, out of 167 listed firms that we observe both immediately before and imme-
diately after the election, only 32 were effectively exchanged in the first trading day
after the election. Those shares decreased on average by 40.8% that day, and then by a
further 17.8% in the rest of the month. For those stocks, therefore, we do observe sub-
stantial delayed adjustment, but the bulk of the decrease happened immediately. The
part of the adjustment which was not immediate may be explained by the acquisition
of new information in the aftermath of the election – for example the growing certainty
that Allende would be confirmed as President by the National Congress – and/or by the
fact that it took some time for investors to fully ‘digest’ the consequences of an Allende
presidency.
The 96 stocks that were not exchanged in the first trading day after the election,
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but were then exchanged in the rest of the month, fell on average by 37.1 percentage
points between election day and September 30.
Importantly, as shown in Table 2, the fall in share prices was broad, with little dif-
ferences across industries. Among the seven sectors in which firms were classified by
contemporary sources, the standard deviation of the percentage change in valuations
is just 10.3% of the average change. This suggests that shareholders’ concerns about
property rights and profitability in publicly-held firms were pervasive across the whole
economy, not just in sectors explicitly targeted for nationalization, such as banking,
insurance and mining.
The 1970 presidential election also coincided with a record increase in dividends paid
by firms listed in the Santiago Exchange. A large spike took place in the months of Au-
gust, September and October 1970, as shown by the dashed line in Figure 3.7 We also
calculate a 12-months moving average (the blue line), in order to show that the spike in
dividends persists also after netting out seasonal effects. This dividends’ boom, that to
the best of our knowledge has gone unnoticed in the literature so far, is likely to reflect
the desire of many shareholders to take their wealth out of Chilean publicly-held firms.
3 The coup d’etat
On Tuesday 11 September 1973, a military coup deposed Allende’s socialist government
and established a military dictatorship. The Santiago exchange remained closed in the
four trading days before the coup and for three trading days after.8 The market reaction
to this event was extraordinary. In the first trading day after the coup (Sep 17), the
IGPA rose by almost 80 percentage points – as displayed in Figure 4. This daily change
lies above the sample average registered until that day by 67.1 standard deviations, and
is 5.5 times larger than the previous maximum. It remains, to date, the largest daily
IGPA increase on record. Although a marked positive trend is visible in the 25 trading
7We digitized historical data on (deflated) monthly dividends paid by firms listed in the Santiago
stock exchange from Malamakis (1983).
8 Immediately after the coup, the exchange was closed – like most other trading activities – because
of civil unrest. It is tempting to speculate that the closing of the stock market between September 5
and 10 (that is, in the days leading to the coup) was related to the forthcoming regime change, but we
were unable to find any direct evidence to this effect.
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days before the coup, which seems to indicate some anticipation effect, the timing and
magnitude of the jump is clearly suggestive of a strong positive reaction of share prices
to this regime change.
A possible concern about this evidence is that part of this jump may have been a
nominal effect due to inflation. Although it is usually safe to assume inflation effects
to be negligible when analyzing daily changes, in this case 13 days passed between the
last trading day before the event (Sep 4) and the first after (Sep 17), and inflation in
Chile was high at the time. Discounting the change in the IGPA index between Sep 4
and Sep 17 on the basis of the officially recorded monthly inflation rate for September
1973, we are still left with a 67% real increase in share prices in one trading day.9
4 Causality tests
In this Section we provide evidence supporting the hypothesis that the sharp market
movements that we have documented can be interpreted as measuring the causal effect
of the ‘Allende-shock’ and of the subsequent coup.
4.1 Comparison with the overall distribution of returns
As a first step, we ask how likely are these movements to just reflect the ordinary sources
of variation in stock prices experienced in the Santiago exchange. To this end, Figure
5 compares the magnitude of the jumps observed after the two events with the overall
distribution of IGPA daily changes. Clearly, both the Allende election and the coup
coincided with unprecedented deviations from normally observed changes in prices.
4.2 Time-series analysis
Second, we perform a time-series analysis controlling for some potential confounders.
Specifically, we control for autoregressive dynamics, domestic inflation and movements
in the US stock market and international copper price (of which Chile was – and still is
– by far the first world producer).
9The officially recorded monthly CPI inflation rate for September 1973 is taken from Malamakis
(1983). Using the CPI series provided by the OECD Main Economic Indicators (accessed in July 2017)
yields an identical figure.
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We regress the daily percentage change in the IGPA index (with respect to the
previous trading day) on its lags, the change in the price level, the change in the US
S&P 500 index and the change in the price of copper in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
(in US dollars).10 We include a dummy equal to one in the first trading day after the
event. We thus estimate the following regression:
∆IGPAt = α+
p∑
j=1
δj∆IGPAt−j +
p∑
j=0
σj∆SP500t−j +
p∑
j=0
φj∆Pt−j+
+
p∑
j=0
µj∆Coppert−j + βDt + t (1)
where IGPA is the natural log of IGPA, P is the natural log of the Consumer Price
Index, SP500 is the natural log of the US S&P 500 stock price index, Copper is the nat-
ural log of the copper price and D is a dummy variable equal to one in the first trading
day after the event considered,11 and  is the error term. Table 3 displays results from
different specifications.
Column 1 provides estimates using the whole available sample period (1961-2016).
Columns 2 and 3 (our preferred specifications) employ, for each event, a time-window
including the 500 trading days before the event. In columns 4 and 5 we exclude the S&P
500 index and the copper price from the regression. In columns 6 and 7 we again use all
control variables, but restrict the time-window to 250 trading days before each event. In
all specifications, the lag length p is chosen on the basis of the BIC criterion (resulting
in p = 5 when using the whole sample and p = 1 when using only a time-window before
the events).
The effect of the ‘Allende shock’ and of the coup on the IGPA index remain virtually
10Historical data on the S&P 500 index was retrieved from Yahoo Finance. The time-series for the
daily spot price of copper (in US dollars per pound) in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange is from the
CME and was downloaded from Quandl. The CPI index is taken from Malamakis (1983), which covers
the 1960-1992 period, and interpolated with the CPI series from the OECD MEI for the post-1992
observations used in column 1 (the two series are virtually identical in the 1970-1992 period in which
they are both available). Both before and after 1992, the domestic CPI is available only at the monthly
frequency. To avoid abrupt jumps in the first day of each month, we produce a smoothed daily series
through cubic splines interpolation. To perform the interpolation, we attribute the monthly average to
the middle of each month. We take all variables in percentage changes because standard unit-root tests
indicate that the outcome variable as well as the controls are non-stationary.
11In the specification which includes both events (column 1), we include two dummy variables.
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unchanged across all regressions, and very close to the unconditional changes observed
in the first trading day after the events (-21.88% and +79.20%, respectively). We con-
clude that US macroeconomic conditions, the international copper market and domestic
inflation did not contribute in any meaningful way to the jumps in stock market values
observed after the institutional shocks examined.12
4.3 Panel two-way fixed effects regression
Third, to control for the influence of potential global and regional common shocks not
captured by the variables included in equation 1, we use major Latin American and
global stock markets as a comparison group. Specifically, we include in the comparison
group the MSCI world index and the US, Mexican and Brazilian stock markets.13
Figure 6 displays this exercise graphically, showing that that the shifts in share
valuations after our events of interest are not explained at all by global and regional
trends. Following this approach, we estimate a two-way fixed-effects regression in a
panel composed by Mexico, Brazil, United States and Chile. We estimate the model
in two versions: (a) using deflated stock indexes as the independent variable (b) using
nominal indexes as the independent variable and including the price level as a control
variable. Observations are at a monthly frequency.14
The first version implies estimating the following regression
∆rit = αi + δt + β1D1it + β2D2it + it (2)
12A potential concern regarding this exercise is that copper price changes are partly endogenous to
the performance of Chilean mining firms, both because of reverse causality and unobserved confounders.
In a robustness test not reported here (available from the authors upon request) we find that results are
unchanged if the copper price is excluded from the regressions or substituted with the index of global
demand for industrial commodities developed by Kilian (2009).
13The MSCI World Index was retrieved from www.msci.com; the US and Mexican indexes are
taken from the OECD Monthly Monetary and Financial Statistics (MEI); the Brazilian index is the
IBOVESPA (downloaded from the website of the Institute for Applied Economic Research (Ipea) at
www.ipeadata.gov.br). All indexes are deflated with the Consumer Price Index. The World CPI Index
was downloaded from the International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics (IFS); the US
and Mexican CPIs were taken from the OECD Main Economic Indicators (MEI); the CPI for Brazil
was downloaded from Ipea.
14Stock indexes for Mexico and Brazil were not available at a higher frequency.
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While the regression corresponding to the second version is
∆yit = αi + δt + γ∆CPIit + β1D1it + β2D2it + it (3)
∆r is the percent change in the deflated stock index; ∆y is the percent change in the
nominal stock index;15 ∆CPI is the percent change in the consumer price index; α1 are
country-specific intercepts and δt are (monthly) time-dummies. D1 is an indicator for
the Allende electoral victory (ie, a dummy equal to one in Chile in September 1970),
while D2 is an indicator for the coup (equal to one in Chile in September 1973). The
estimation period is 1970m1-1975m12.
The resulting estimated effect of the ‘Allende shock’ on monthly stock valuations is
-45% (cluster-robust standard error: 2.1%) when estimated from eq.2 and -52% (cluster-
robust standard error: 2.1%) when estimating eq. 3. The effect of the military coup
is 80.8% (cluster-robust standard error: 3.3%) from eq. 2 and 100.8% (cluster-robust
standard error: 2.8%) from eq.3. We thus conclude that using these major American
stock markets as a control group confirms the effect sizes inferred from the IGPA daily
changes.
5 Gauging anticipation effects
Our exercise exploits the fact that the Allende election came as a surprise, and that
the success (if not the occurrence) of the Pinochet coup could not have been entirely
anticipated. Still, the changes in stock market valuations that provide the basis for our
analysis are bound to underestimate the effect of these shocks to political institutions:
market valuations before the election must have had already internalized some non-zero
probability of a socialist victory; similarly, before the 1973 coup some anticipation effect
may have been due to awareness of the increasing possibility of an event of this type,
given the political and economic context, or to private information. Unfortunately, there
is no information allowing quantification of the extent of the anticipation effect in the
15We take stock indexes in percentage changes because a Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test for panel data
indicates that both nominal and deflated stock indexes are likely to be non-stationary (the p-value for
the null hypothesis that all panels contain a unit root is 0.99 for nominal indexes and 0.49 for deflated
indexes in our estimation period.)
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case of the military coup. On the other hand, surveys conducted before the 1970 election
allow some quantification with respect to the ‘Allende shock’. In what follows, we use
data from vote expectation surveys to obtain a measure of the perceived probability of
a socialist victory. We focus on the wealthy individuals that were likelier to hold shares.
We then use this information to recover an approximate estimate of the overall effect
of the ‘Allende shock’. We show in the appendix that voting intentions surveys, while
clearly inferior to vote expectation data for our purposes, yield similar estimates.
5.1 Voting expectations and perceived probability of Allende victory
The value of the IGPA in the day before the 1970 election can be seen as a weighted
average of expected valuations conditional on the three possible election outcomes, with
weights given by perceived probabilities.16 As a result, we can recover an estimate of the
overall effect as the observed price change divided by the estimated surprise (defined as
one minus the ex-ante perceived probability of the event). We use the vote expectation
surveys conducted by Eduardo Hamuy, founder in 1957 of an innovative public opinion
research program at the University of Santiago (Cordero, 2009, pp. 75-76), to obtain an
approximate measure of the ‘surprise’.
Hamuy’s surveys asked (mostly) residents of the Santiago metropolitan area, among
other questions, “who do you think will win the upcoming presidential election?”.17
Results are reported in Tables 4 and 5.18 In the two months before the election, the
share of responders predicting an Allende victory has been stable and near 30% overall
(second column of Table 5).19
Importantly, the share predicting an Allende victory is significantly lower among
the wealthier individuals who were much more likely to hold shares in the Santiago
16As usual in the literature, in this discussion we are abstracting from risk aversion, as we have no
measure of the degree of risk aversion of investors in the Santiago stock market in that period.
17Our translation. The original question in spanish was: “En su opinion, cual de los candidados cree
usted que ganera` la proxima eleccion presidencial?”. In some of the surveys the wording is slightly
different: “En este momento, cual cree usted que es el candidato que tiene mejores posibilidades de
triunfo?”.
18We downloaded Hamuy’s datasets from the online archive of the Roper Center for Public Opinion
Research (Cornell University).
19Graefe (2014) shows that vote expectation surveys are among the best predictors of electoral out-
comes, and that their role is comparable to that of prediction markets. Favorable results on the predictive
power of voting expectation surveys are found also by Rothschild and Wolfers, 2012.
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stock market. This is shown in Table 5, where we use four alternative proxies for
wealth, based on the information contained in Hamuy’s surveys. In the third column,
we define as wealthy an individual who declares to live in a ‘luxury mansion’, ‘luxury
apartment’ or ‘upper-middle class home’ (the remaining categories are ‘lower-middle
class’, ‘modest’, ‘poor’ and ‘very poor’). In the fourth column, we look at socio-economic
status (as assessed by the interviewer), including those who are classified as displaying a
‘very good’ or ‘good’ socio-economic level (other categories are ‘regular’, ‘bad’ and ‘very
bad’). In the fifth column we use a more restrictive classification, including only those
with ‘very good’ socio-economic level. Finally, in the last column we consider those
who declare that their income ‘is well sufficient and allows them to save some money’
(excluded categories are ‘sufficient, no difficulties’; ‘not sufficient, some hardship’; ‘not
sufficient, great hardship’). The fact that wealthier individuals were less likely to predict
an Allende victory clearly holds across different surveys and different proxies for wealth.
In surveys performed in the last two months before the election, during which time
figures appear rather stable, the share predicting an Allende victory among the wealthy
varies between 11.4% and 19.2% depending on the proxy employed for wealth, with a
simple average of 15.5%. We employ a logit model to estimate the predicted probability
of expecting an Allende victory for an individual with an upper-middle class or luxury
home and a salary sufficient to accumulate savings.20 The resulting estimate is 13.7%.
We interpret this as the ex-ante probability of an Allende victory perceived by potential
investors.21 Combined with the observed 48.6% cumulative fall in share prices in the
aftermath of the election, this suggests an overall effect around 56%.
20The logit model indicates that the socio-economic status as assessed by the interviewer provides
no significant explanatory power, after controlling for house type and salary (the p-value on the socio-
economic status variable is 0.94, while coefficients on the house type and salary variables are significant
with p < 0.01).
21Of course, the assumption that the average perceived probability of the event among respondents is
equal to the share of respondents ‘expecting’ the event is a crude one. However, a more sophisticated
approach would require information on the shape of the distribution of underlying perceived probabilities,
which is not available.
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6 Conclusions
The evidence we have presented contributes to a growing literature on the effect of
political shocks on financial markets (e.g. Dube, Kaplan, and Naidu, 2011; Snowberg,
Wolfers, and Zitzewitz, 2007) by documenting the effect of one of the sharpest electoral
shocks in recent history and its subsequent reversal.
Of course, the price change we observe after each event equals the overall effect of the
institutional shock times the surprise (defined as one minus the ex-ante probability of the
event). The overall effect of expected policy differences between a Alessandri regime and
a UP regime is therefore larger than the 48.6% fall in prices observed after the election.
Importantly, the evidence we have presented is not limited to voting intention polls,
but includes data on vote expectations by social class. As we have shown, pre-election
surveys suggest that the perceived ex-ante probability of a socialist victory was around
14% among the wealthy individuals who were likelier to trade stocks. The implied overall
effect would then be a 56% decrease in values. The marked increase in stock prices prior
to the coup may reflect an analogous internalization of some positive likelihood of a
regime change. If this is the case, the difference in stock market valuations associated
with the two regimes is considerably greater than the 80 percent one-day change in stock
prices.
Even without taking account of the likely partial internalization of some probability
of both events, the stock price changes we have observed are of a different order of
magnitude than those found in the previous literature, which mostly focused on US
elections, arguably reflecting much larger policy divergence in the events we study. Stock
market effects of this magnitude imply that institutional/political regime changes can
have very substantial impacts on investment incentives, wealth inequality, and other
determinants of growth and distribution.
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Figure 1: Deflated IGPA index (monthly, 1976=100)
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Figure 2: IGPA index around the September 4 1970 election
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Figure 3: Monthly real dividends paid by firms listed in Santiago
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Figure 4: IGPA index around the September 11 1973 coup
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Figure 5: Empirical distribution of IGPA daily percentage changes (1961-2016, bin width
0.10)
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Figure 6: Deflated Stock Indices
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Table 1: Voting intention surveys taken before the 1970 Presidential election
(summary published on El Mercurio on Aug 30 1970)
Allende
Survey date Area n Tomic Alessandri Allende Undecided margin
11-13 April Gran Santiago 1,217 26.3% 38.9% 25.0% 9.8% -15.4
24-27 April Gran Santiago 1,108 28.3 40.6 27.1 4.0 -14.1
24-27 April Valparaiso-Vina 621 28.4 42.4 25.4 3.8 -17.7
24-27 April Concepcion-Talcahuano 648 37.1 30.0 23.5 9.4 -15.0
29 May-9 June National 3,711 26.7 32.4 26.3 14.5 -7.1
19-23 June Gran Santiago 1,333 28.1 37.4 31.3 3.2 -6.3
11-14 July Gran Santiago 1,243 21.2 41.9 31.5 5.5 -11.0
11-14 July Concepcion-Talcahuano 676 32.8 29.6 33.5 4.0 +0.7
8-16 Aug National 4,104 26.8 40.3 29.5 3.4 -11.2
8-11 Aug Gran Santiago 1,296 26.2 39.0 27.3 7.5 -12.6
21-24 Aug Gran Santiago 1,290 26.8 40.3 29.5 3.4 -11.2
Allende margin = Allende share - max(Alessandri share, Tomic share), with shares recalculated after
excluding the undecided. Source: p.35 of the Aug 30, 1970 issue of El Mercurio
Table 2: Average price changes of stocks traded in the Santiago Exchange
Sep 1970 presidential election Sep 1973 military coup
first trading first trading
day (Sep 8) until Sep 30 day (Sep 17) until Sep 30
n change n change n change n change
All 32 -40.8% 128 -41.2% 48 85.4% 93 112.3%
Agriculture 3 -36.2% 10 -45.4% 5 56.3% 10 47.0%
Banking 5 -38.7% 10 -47.8% 5 102.1% 6 171.3%
Insurance 0 n/a 7 -37.0% 1 336.4% 1 336.4%
Metallurgy 5 -49.0% 12 -43.2% 3 113.2% 8 124.6%
Mining 2 -65.4% 11 -45.1% 1 27.3% 8 69.3%
Textile 1 -7.7% 10 -36.9% 4 89.0% 7 378.6%
Manuf. & others 16 -38.6% 68 -39.8% 29 77.5% 53 83.1%
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Table 3: Robustness time-series regressions
Dependent variable: IGPA index % change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Allende -23.16 -22.16 -22.13 -22.90
(0.15) (0.53) (0.54) (0.24)
Coup 78.69 81.10 80.54 81.18
(0.52) (0.65) (0.38) (0.81)
Obs. 13,905 501 501 501 501 251 251
R2 0.38 0.60 0.87 0.60 0.87 0.85 0.89
Window 1961-2016 500 obs 500 obs 500 obs 500 obs 250 obs 250 obs
IGPA lags X X X X X X X
Inflation X X X X X X X
Copper X X X X X
S&P500 X X X X X
All control variables taken in percentage changes; Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4: Hamuy’s pre-electoral surveys: answers to the questions ‘Who would you vote
for if the presidential election were to be held next Sunday’ and ‘Who do you think will
win the upcoming presidential election?’ – Whole sample
voting intention expected winner
month n Tomic Alessandri Allende no answer Tomic Alessandri Allende no answer
1/1969 677 18.3% 51.7% 13.3% 16.7% - - - -
2/1969 853 23.7 43.6 17.9 14.8 - - - -
7/1969 537 22.9 46.2 18.2 12.7 - - - -
3/1970 625 27.8 39.5 19.0 13.6 27.7 46.6 13.0 12.8
3/1970 298 31.2 33.6 24.5 10.7 25.5 43.3 16.4 14.8
5/1970 679 28.7 35.8 26.1 9.4 25.2 43.9 20.6 10.3
6/1970 685 38.5 25.1 25.7 10.7 39.9 25.0 23.2 12
7/1970 473 34.5 33.6 26.4 5.5 27.9 31.7 23.9 16.5
7/1970 886 26.0 35.4 33.2 5.4 23.7 39.3 28.1 8.9
8/1970 721 25.7 33.8 30.2 10.3 28.4 31.9 22.9 16.8
8/1970 349 26.7 37.0 31.5 4.9 26.9 35.0 27.5 10.6
Sample of adult residents of metropolitan Santiago (except for the first July 1970 survey and the June
1970 one, which were both taken in the ‘Valparaiso and Vina del Mar’ area). Face to face interviews.
Source: CEDOP/Hamuy Archive. Datasets downloaded from the Roper Center for Public Opinion
Research website.
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Table 5: Hamuy’s pre-electoral surveys: share of respondents expecting Allende to win
the 1970 presidential election among the wealthy
living in good or very good very good income
upper-middle class socio-economic socio-economic sufficient to
month whole sample home or better status status save money
3/1970 14.9% (n=625) 7.9% (n=103) 9.0% (n=149) 0% (n=10) 5.9% (n=43)
3/1970 19.3 (n=298) 2.4 (n=55) 5.3 (n=70) 5.7 (n=64) 21.4 (n=19)
5/1970 23.0 (n=679) 10.6 (n=103) 13.9 (n=126) 6.3 (n=19) 5.8 (n=62)
6/1970 26.4 (n=685) 20.8 (n=125) 24.9 (n=199) 11.1 (n=19) 13.3 (n=66)
7/1970 28.6 (n=473) 12.5 (n=77) 18.4 (n=123) 11.8 (n=19) 19.6 (n=54)
7/1970 30.9 (n=886) 15.2 (n=104) 19.3 (n=182) 7.1 (n=30) 15.5 (n=80)
8/1970 27.5 (n=721) 13.2 (n=121) 19.6 (n=183) 14.7 (n=43) 15.4 (n=45)
8/1970 30.8 (n=349) 18.0 (n=67) n.a. n.a. n.a
tot. 7-8/1970 29.5 (n=2,429) 14.6 (n=369) 19.2 (n=488) 11.4 (n=92) 16.7 (n=179)
Shares calculated after excluding undecided and no answers. n = size of the subsample (including
undecided and no answers). Sample of adult residents of metropolitan Santiago (except for the first
July 1970 survey and the June 1970 one, which were both taken in the ‘Valparaiso and Vina del Mar’
area). Face to face interviews. Source: CEDOP/Hamuy Archive. Datasets downloaded from the Roper
Center for Public Opinion Research website.
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Appendix: Voting intention surveys and probability of Al-
lende victory
We have reported voting intentions from Hamuy’s data (Table 4) and from other sur-
veys performed in the months leading to the 1970 election and published by the leading
newspaper El Mercurio (Table 1). Not a single one of the Hamuy surveys has Allende as
the front runner, although he clearly gained ground after his candidacy was confirmed
by the UP in early 1970. Alessandri had announced his candidacy earlier, in 1969 (Navia
and Osorio, 2017, p. 10).1
Concerning the other surveys, out of 11 opinion polls taken between April 1970 and
the election (two at the national level, six taken in the ‘Gran Santiago’ area, two taken
in Concepcion and Talcahuano, one taken in Valparaiso and Vina del Mar), only one
(taken between July 11 and July 14 in Concepcion and Talcahuano) had Allende closely
winning, while 9 (including the two taken at the national level) had Alessandri winning
and 1 predicted a Tomic victory. The last national poll taken before the election indi-
cated a 11.1% margin between Alessandri and Allende.
It is interesting to ask if the voting intention surveys in Table 1 (conducted inde-
pendently of those of Hamuy, as far as we know) imply an ex-ante perceived probability
of Allende victory broadly consistent with Hamuy’s expectation surveys data (in which,
in the overall population, 30% of responders expected an Allende victory). Of course
this calculation requires some rule for inferring probabilities of victory from voting in-
tentions, which is not straightforward. To provide a rough calculation, we use data from
surveys and prediction markets concerning the 2000 Mexican presidential election to
infer a relation between margins in voting intentions and probabilities of victory, and
then apply this relation to the data in Table 1.
The Mexican electoral system can be considered analogous to the one holding in
1Figure 1 in Navia and Osorio (2017, p. 11) appears to suggest that Allende suddenly gained a
substantial lead in Hamuy’s second August 1970 survey. This is not what is found in the Hamuy surveys
as available at the Roper Center website (which is also the source cited by their article). We believe
that this is a mistake caused by the fact that, as of August 10 2017 (when we last accessed the website),
the ASCII version of the dataset available in the Roper Center website appeared to be mistaken, given
that results, number of observations and number of options for each question did not coincide with the
metadata and with the original documents reporting results (which the Roper Center also provides in
scanned PDF format). The SPSS version of the dataset, instead, appears consistent with the metadata
and the PDFs, and it contains the figures that we have reported in Table 4.
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Chile in 1970: the president is elected in a multi-candidate election and a plurality of
votes is sufficient to win the presidency.2 Besides the electoral system, the 2000 Mexican
election also shares other similarities with the Chilean 1970 election: three candidates
received more than 10% of the vote each, the election was won by an opposition party
which had never been in power before, and the outcome was largely a surprise. The
Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM – one of the most popular prediction markets) provides
data on implied probabilities of victory for the 2000 election in Mexico.3 We match
the IEM data with data on voting intentions from the Mexico 2000 Panel Study (as
reported in Klesner, 2005) to infer a relation between shares in voting intention surveys
and probabilities of victory.
According to the Mexico 2000 Panel Study, as of June (the election was held on
July 2), 35% of respondents supported the incumbent PRI, 23% the PAN (who would
eventually win the election) and 10% the PRD, while the remaining 32% of respondents
supported none or were undecided. The margin between the PRI and the PAN can-
didates (after excluding the undecided) was 17.6%. The probability of a PAN victory
implied by the IEM prediction market before the election was around 27%, while the
probability of a PRI victory was around 73%. The ratio between the margin in perceived
probabilities and in voting intention shares was therefore 2.6. If we apply the same ratio
to the Chile 1970 election, the implied probability of an Allende victory would be 26%.
Reassuringly, this figure is quite near to the share of responders expecting an Allende
victory in the Hamuy’s vote expectation surveys which we use as our main source (30%).
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